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THE INSANITY DEFENSE IN OPERATION:
A PRACTICING PSYCHIATRIST VIEWS
DURHAM AND BRAWNER
DANIEL D. PUGH*
Unlike the other participants in this symposium, I am neither a
scholar nor theoretician in the field of the insanity defense. Instead, I
was a practitioner of forensic psychiatry for two years under the juris-
diction of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
while the Durham rule' was in effect. From 1968 to 1970 I was as-
signed by the United States Public Health Service to duty as a medical
officer (psychiatry) in the John Howard Pavilion of St. Elizabeths
Hospital. John Howard Pavilion is a 400-bed maximum security unit
which is almost exclusively devoted to the evaluation and treatment of
mentally ill felony suspects. Of John Howard's twelve wards, three
during my stay were assigned to pretrial observations and nine handled
post-trial treatment of patients found not guilty by reason of insanity.
A smaller number of patients were committed as mentally incompetent
to stand trial or as convicted prisoners who had become insane while
serving sentence. Some patients were civilly committed or were vol-
untary admissions, but required maximum security. I was assigned to
both evaluation and treatment wards, and often treated patients I had
evaluated and found to be insane. Thus I was from time to time priv-
ileged to observe the miraculous recoveries of patients who had success-
fully malingered insanity. As for mistakes in the other direction:
either I never found anyone sane who was in fact insane, or else the
prison never sent any of these patients to the hospital. I think the lat-
ter explanation is more likely.
Not all of the patients at John Howard Pavilion were under the
jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia. Some came from federal jurisdictions in which the Amer-
ican Law Institute sanity test was in effect. Thus, I had practical ex-
perience with both tests as an "expert witness."
* Director of In-Patient Service, Malcom Bliss Mental Health Center, St. Louis;
Assistant Professor, Department of Psychiatry, Washington University. A.B., 1960,
Carleton College; M.D., 1964, Washington University.
1. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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Actually "expert witnesses" usually do not think of themselves as be-
ing professional witnesses. Most think of themselves as psychiatrists
who work in a hospital or ward for mentally ill legal offenders, for
that is what most of them do. The purpose of this essay, then, is to
describe the problems of the insanity defense and criminal commit-
ment as they appear to a psychiatrist in a hospital for the criminally
insane.2 Viewed from this vantage point, the terrain seems to look
quite different from the way it appeared to the Court of Appeals in
United States v. Brawner.3 For example, I was surprised to find in
the Brawner decision that the principle issue determining the court's
preference of sanity tests seemed to be the "undue dominance by the
experts giving testimony."4  In the Brawner decision the Durham test
is replaced by the ALl test, chiefly to avoid dominance by experts.
Judge Bazelon's concurring opinion favors the Wechsler test ("cannot
justly be held responsible") over the ALl test, chiefly because he feels
it would be still more effective in curbing dominance by the experts.
Indeed, he now feels in retrospect that the Durham test was adopted in
the first place because it was hoped that it would permit less dominance
by experts than the test which had preceded it.
I must confess I am mystified by the court's use of the degree of ex-
pert dominance as the prime criterion for acceptability of a sanity test.
It is not the sanity test that is responsible for expert dominance; it is the
whole way the judicial process works in actual practice. The overall
process for deciding insanity defense cases does not discourage domina-
tion by experts; it encourages it. Indeed, it insures it so certainly that
the particular sanity test employed can influence matters only slightly.
THE JUDICIAL PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINATION OF SANITY
The following process describes how the question of insanity was
decided in the District of Columbia when I was at St. Elizabeths Hospi-
tal. This is also how it is presently determined; Brawner has only
changed the wording of some of the documents involved.
In a felony prosecution, if anyone raises the question of insanity and
requests a psychiatric evaluation of the defendant, the judge is virtually
2. Since I have had little experience with pretrial evaluation of misdemeanants,
and since misdemeanants are rarely found not guilty by reason of insanity, the sub-
sequent discussion shall be concerned only with accused felons.
3. 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
4. Id. at 981.
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obligated to order the defendant committed to St. Elizabeths Hospital
to be examined to determine whether he is competent to stand trial
and whether he was sane at the time of the crime. The court order
authorizing the examination quotes verbatim the language of the in-
sanity test currently prevailing in the District in specifying the questions
the hospital is to answer. The hospital's report to the court quotes the
same language that was on the court order. Both the court order and
the hospital report quoted Durham and McDonald v. United States5
before June 23, 1972, the date the Brawner opinion was issued, but
the essential information contained in the report to the court remains
unchanged. The report states whether the patient 1) has a psychiat-
ric diagnosis, 2) is competent to stand trial, and 3) was sane at the
time of the alleged act. Those three pieces of information are the real
substance of the report, though each piece may be couched in a para-
graph of legal formula language. The three pieces of information con-
tained in these reports are decided by a single psychiatrist, since the
hospital-indeed the entire District of Columbia-can only rarely mus-
ter the psychiatric manpower for double or multiple independent ex-
aminations.
In the overwhelming majority of cases the hospital's report to the
court is the sole determinant of the outcome of the insanity defense.
If the hospital reports that the patient was sane at the time of the al-
leged act, the defense almost always abandons the insanity plea. Since
over seventy-five percent of felons examined are reported as having
been sane, the majority of insanity defenses are thus resolved before the
case even comes to trial. If the hospital reports that the defendant was
insane, the prosecution ceases to contest the issue. This results in a
trial that would perhaps surprise the framers of Washington v. United
States:' it is a trial by judge with the verdict never in doubt. The de-
fense stipulates that the crime cited in the indictment occurred and that
the defendant committed it. Then the expert psychiatrist is put on
the stand.
The nature of his testimony depends on the specific trial judge pre-
siding. A few judges will take over the questioning of the psychiatrist
and examine him closely in a sincere effort to assure themselves that
justice is being done. Most feel that psychiatry is over their heads,
and simply allow the prosecution and defense to formalize the deal
5, 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
6. 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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they have made. Approximately a quarter of the judges are in such a
hurry to get the "trial" over with that they will not permit the questioning

















[May be either defense or prosecuting attorney, or in cases
of extreme impatience, the judge.] Have you examined
the defendant and arrived at a diagnosis?
Yes.
What is the diagnosis?
Paranoid schizophrenia [or any other diagnosis].
Do you find that the defendant has a rational as well as
factual understanding of these proceedings against him and
is he able to consult and cooperate with his attorney in his
own defense?
Yes.
I declare the defendant competent to stand trial. Proceed.
Did you find in your examination of the defendant that at
the time of the crime he was suffering from a mental
disease which substantially affected his mental or emotion-
al processes and substantially impaired his behavioral con-
trols?
Yes.
What was that disease?
Paranoid schizophrenia.
Did you find that the crime was the product of the de-
fendant's schizophrenia? [I assume this question is now
worded according to the ALI rule.]
Yes.
I declare the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity.




7. Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968). After a defendant has been
acquitted by reason of insanity in the District of Columbia, a judicial hearing must be
held on the question of whether the defendant involved ought to be retained in cus-
tody on the basis of his current mental condition. The procedures at the hearing
are substantially similar to those in proceedings for civil commitment of the dan-
gerous mentally ill. For a fuller discussion of the development of this aspect of the
insanity defense in the District of Columbia, see United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969,
996-98 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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Examiner: Do you find that the defendant is still suffering from para-
noid schizophrenia?
Psychiatrist: Yes.
Examiner: Is he likely to be dangerous to himself or others in the
foreseeable future because of his illness?
Psychiatrist: Yes.
Judge: I hereby commit the defendant to St. Elizabeths Hospital
until such time as this court is satisfied that he is no
longer likely to be a danger to himself or others in the
foreseeable future by reason of mental illness. Adjourned.
Even when the judge allows questioning to expand beyond this
script, the fact remains that in over ninety percent of trials involving
the actual employment of the insanity defense dominance of the jury
by the experts is not a valid issue because there is no jury. In such
cases the judge seems bound by the experts' testimony even when he
appears to have major reservations about it. (I remember one trial
in which the judge was so outraged by the deal the prosecution and de-
fense had made that he could not bring himself to declare the defendant
not guilty by reason of insanity. It turned out that his only recourse
was to transfer the trial to another judge whose feelings about the
case were not so strong.) The prosecuting attorneys go along with the
procedure even when they will confide to another psychiatrist on no
uncertain terms that they feel the expert witness in the case is a fool
and the defendant is obviously sane. It is virtually impossible for the
prosecution to have the defendant examined by another psychiatrist.
Thus, the expert witness dictates the verdict.
I trust this tour through the judicial process has illustrated how, by
one means or another, the opinion of the psychiatrist who examines the
defendant is almost certain to become the verdict of the court. Since
this is so, I believe a sanity test is better judged by the effect it has on
psychiatrists than by the effect it has on juries. I shall return to that
matter shortly, but right now I would like to digress a bit, to point out
that a sanity test may be viewed as a prognostic test and judged accord-
ingly.
THE SANITY TEST AS A PROGNOSTIC TEST
In medicine a prognostic test is a procedure that predicts what will
happen to a patient. For instance, an elevated blood urea nitrogen
predicts that a patient will be found to have kidney disease. Conver-
Vol. 1973:87]
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sion of a tuberculin test from negative to positive predicts that a patient
will be found to be infected with tuberculosis. These tests are often
called diagnostic tests, but then a diagnosis is nothing but a technical
term designed to briefly communicate a great deal of prognostic infor-
mation.
I am sure legal theoreticians will object at this point and say that a
sanity test predicts nothing; it is concerned with the past-the time of
the crime-not the future. I am well aware of the theoretical function
of a sanity test. The problem is that a sanity verdict not only deter-
mines criminal guilt, but also has other effects which are probably more
important. If a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity had practi-
cal as well as theoretical value, the defendant would walk out of the
courtroom a free man. Instead, he is almost always sent to a hospital
for the criminally insane under a criminal commitment order.8 In a
way, that is worse than going to prison, for in prison a man gets out
when his time is up. A man in a hospital for the criminally insane
is there under a triple lock: the first lock is his illness, which must re-
mit before he can be released; the second lock is his doctor; and the
third lock is the judge. Both doctor and judge must agree that the pa-
tient has recovered his sanity before he will be released. Each feels a
strong responsibility for the safety of the community. The doctor
must convince the judge of the patient's recovery; the judge must de-
mand that the doctor convince him. The public hearings required may
attract the attention of the press. In contrast, a patient civilly com-
mitted is released by a simple order in the ward order book when his
doctor feels he would be better off at home. There is no doubt in my
mind that criminal commitment is substantially more harmful to most
patients' welfare than is civil commitment. Why shouldn't patients
found not guilty by reason of insanity be civilly committed? Why
should a criminal court retain jurisdiction over them after they have
been found innocent? The only explanation I can see for these pro-
cedures is that the theory behind the insanity defense is almost totally
divorced from its actual practical function. Frankly, it seems to me
that the theory behind the defense is simply fallacious, and a verdict of
not guilty by reason of insanity is not an acquittal at all, but a special
type of conviction that leads to a special type of sentencing. I have
8. The Bolton decision in the District of Columbia, requiring a separate hearing
for issuance of the commitment order, has really changed nothing. In two years' time
I only heard of one defendant who was released at his Bolton hearing.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss1/7
THE INSANITY DEFENSE
examined more than one defendant who feared that he might be found
-guilty by reason of insanity," thus displaying the insight that often
accompanies naivet6.
Whenthe insanity defense is raised, both the defendant and the
prosecutor are more concerned about the future than about the past.
The defendant's concerns are obvious. But prosecutors also consider
whether prison or a hospital is more likely to rehabilitate the defendant
and protect the public. It is true that the prosecutor's opinions are
limited by what the psychiatrist has to say about the past, but in in-
formal pretrial conferences prosecutors show by the questions they ask
that they are very much concerned about the defendant's future. Con-
scientious judges show the same concern by their questions to the psy-
chiatrist on the stand.
I think this covert concern about the defendant's future is entirely
appropriate, since the effect of a sanity verdict is to send a defendant
either to prison or to a hospital. This is an important decision, for I
believe that it is a simple practical truth that some felons need to be in
prison and others need to be in a hospital, and it is often a very bad
thing for one of them to be sent to the wrong place. It so happens
that the insanity defense is virtually the only mechanism the law has
for deciding whether a felon will be sent to a hospital instead of prison.9
Since this is so, it is important that a sanity test be capable of predict-
ing whether prison or a hospital would be a disastrous disposition for
the defendant. This prediction is the least we can expect of a sanity
test. As far as I am concerned, a sanity test is no good if it fiddles
around with arcane matters such as trying to guess whether the de-
fendant was capable of some sort of theoretical malice at the time of
the crime, but still fails to make the crucial prediction.
Because I think prediction is the central function of the sanity test,
I judge sanity tests by the twin criteria that determine the worth of any
prognostic test: reliability and validity.
THE RELIABILITY OF SANITY TESTS
Reliability is much the same as reproducibility. If a test is given to
9. I am aware that defendants are sometimes "saved" from prison by a semi-
pernanent commitment as mentally incompetent to stand trial, but this is a desperate
and highly regrettable course of action which is usually prompted by the defense at-
torney's fear that his insane defendant may not meet the technical criteria for a finding
of not guilty by reason of insanity.
Vol. 1973:871
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the same subject several times during an interval in which there should
be no change in the subject, and the test results show little variance,
the reliability of that test is good. If there is considerable variance,
the reliability is poor. Ideally, reliability should not diminish if dif-
ferent evaluators are applying the test.
My opportunity to observe the reliability of the sanity tests arose in
the minority of cases in which the defendant was given a staff con-
ference in which two or more psychiatrists (evaluators) participated.
The defendant's attending psychiatrist would present the history; then
the patient would be interviewed in the conference. Following this,
the psychiatrists would discuss the case and form their conclusions.
It was interesting to note that, in spite of the pressure for consensus
implicit in the practice of sending a single report to the court, there
frequently was disagreement among the doctors, and the report sent to the
court represented the same sort of compromise that results when an
appeals court sits en banc. If the doctors had each submitted individual
reports the rate of agreement regarding sanity on a series of defendants
would have been perhaps sixty to seventy percent.' Since we performed
examinations under both Durham and ALl, we could compare their ef-
fects. It seemed to me that most psychiatrists on the staff applied ALl
fairly uniformly: they found a defendant insane only if he were so ill
that he suffered a generalized destruction of judgment, or if the illness
had, by an effect specific to that illness, led him to commit the specific
crime in question.
The Durham rule was another matter. Psychiatrists varied widely in
their notions of the circumstances which might permit a crime to be con-
sidered the product of a disease. Some psychiatrists essentially disre-
garded the Durham rule in favor of the more traditional approach: they
only found the crime to be a product of the disease if the disease had de-
stroyed the defendant's capacity to recognize the criminal nature of the
10. The question of the inter-rater reliability of psychiatric diagnosis has been sys-
tematically studied. Phillip Ash found that when a team of psychiatrists interviews a
patient together in a staff conference setting, there is only fifty-seven to sixty-seven
parcent chance of any two of them agreeing even as to which broad diagnostic category
(e.g., psychosis versus neurosis versus psychopathic personality) best fits the patient.
Ash, The Reliability of Psychiatric Diagnoses, 44 1. ABNORMAL AND SOCIAL PSYCHOL-
oGY 272, 276 (1949). M.G. Sandifer, in a similar study, found fifty-seven percent
agreement on specific diagnosis and seventy-one percent agreement as to whether the
patient was psychotic or not. Sandifer, Pettus & Quade, A Study of Psychiatric Diag-
nosis, 139 J. NERVOUS AND MENTAL DISEASE 350, 355 (1964).
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crime or had destroyed his capacity to conform his behavior to the re-
quirements of the law. Others assumed productivity to be present in
any defendant whose illness could cause impairment of judgment, no
matter how slight. Thus, when a diagnosis of schizophrenia or per-
sonality disorder was made, productivity was usually assumed. After
all, everything a man does is a product of his personality. And there is
a personality diagnosis in the psychiatric nomenclature for almost every-
one. Furthermore, those who were psychoanalytic in their orientation
were confronted with the psychoanalytic doctrine that everyone is at
least a little neurotic, and everyone's neurotic traits determine in part
everything he thinks, feels or does. Free will is as alien to psychoanaly-
sis as it is fundamental to legal theory.
Operating without meaningful guidelines from the court as to what
sort of concept of causation was really intended by the "product"
formulation, doctors sometimes became immoderate in their views.
A common experience was that a new doctor on the service would
find virtually every defendant insane. Some would actually insist
that anyone who would commit a felony must be insane. How-
ever, after being confronted with the task of trying to manage an un-
selected group of felons in the hospital following their criminal com-
mitment, the new doctor would reverse tack and become very stringent
about finding defendants insane. I found that the nonprofessional
staff of the hospital had seen this pattern so often that they expected
it of any new doctor. Under the Durham rule many doctors felt they
could justify a finding of sanity only if they found the defendant to be
free of mental illness, so the rate of finding "no mental disorder" would
rise when they began finding less insanity in the defendants they ex-
amined." The secretaries who typed the reports to the court in-
11. It is instructive to note that the service which examined felons found about
seventy-five to eighty percent of defendants to have "no mental disorder," whereas
the service which examined misdemeanants (who never raised the insanity defense or
returned to haunt their examiners) found less than ten percent to have "no mental
disorder." D. CHAMBERS, A REPORT ON JOHN HowARD PAVILION AT ST. ELIZABETHS
HOSPITAL 23 (June 4, 1969) (unpublished report submitted to St. Elizabeths Hospital
and the National Institute of Mental Health). There probably were more psychotics
among the misdemeanants, but the differences between the misdemeanants and felon pop-
ulations were not nearly as extreme as the reports to the court would indicate. There
was a real difference in diagnostic tradition on the two services. This was most clearly
demonstrated whenever a misdemeanant was reported as insane and it was subsequently
discovered that he was out on bond pending a felony trial. In such a case the district
court would be bound to commit the defendant to John Howard Pavilion for a second
pretrial examination with regard to the felony. I remember four or five such cases,
Vol. 1973:871
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formed me that one doctor who had been there before I came had
never adjusted to these pressures, and switched every few months from
finding everyone insane to finding everyone sane and then back again.
Other extraneous factors also determined some doctors' decisions.
Some doctors seemed to have the "policy" that anyone who committed
a sex crime was insane. Some doctors tended to find a defendant in-
sane if they felt the hospital could "help" him-or if they felt sorry
for him. One psychologist had a racial quirk: though he might find
black defendants either sane or insane, he invariably found any white
defendant to be insane.
Often the patients committed for treatment filed writs of habeas cor-
pus, alleging that their confinement was "arbitrary and capricious."
The phrase stuck in my mind because it described so aptly the process
for deciding a defendant's sanity status. When so many doctors had
such arbitrary and idiosyncratic standards for determining sanity, the
finding for a given defendant depended too greatly upon the specific
doctor who was assigned to examine him. It was too much like draw-
ing straws, for you will remember that the great majority of defendants
were examined by only one psychiatrist, and his opinion became the
verdict of the court.
Therefore, from what I have seen of the Durham and ALI sanity
tests in action, poor reliability is a major problem with both of them,
but it is a far worse problem with the Durham test-so much so that I
am vastly pleased that it has been abandoned. I might also add that I
am even more pleased that the court did not adopt the Wechsler test
advocated by Judge Bazelon, for in the large majority of cases which
are resolved without a jury trial, it would be one psychiatrist alone, with
all his quirks and prejudices and all his brusque confidence in his own
professional judgment who would decide whether the defendant could
justly be held responsible for his act. Personally, I am appalled at
the thought of any one man deciding the issue by such a broad and
subjective guideline. The reliability of that test would be even less
than that of Durham.
THE VALIDITY OF SANITY TESTS
The other criterion for judging a prognostic test is validity. A test
has high validity if it predicts what it is supposed to predict. A test
and in all but one, the staff of John Howard Pavilion not only found the defendant
sane, but also found no mental illness present.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss1/7
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may have high reliability but poor validity. Such a test would always
make the same prediction when applied to the same subject in a brief
interval, but the prediction would be wrong.
What is it that a sanity test is supposed to predict? As I stated
above, I think that the least a sanity test should be expected to predict
is whether it would be disastrous to send a defendant to prison on the
one hand or to a hospital on the other. I cannot overemphasize the
practical importance of keeping a given defendant out of an institution
that is wrong for him. I am sure it takes no effort to imagine the effect
of sending a psychotic to a contemporary prison. From time to time
when I was at John Howard Pavilion we received prisoners in transfer
who had been discovered to be mentally ill while serving time in Lorton
Reformatory.' 2 The suspicion that the prisoner might be insane usu-
ally resulted from a very serious suicide attempt or a series of less seri-
ous attempts, or the prisoner could not be made to accept prison dis-
cipline by even the most determined efforts of the prison. These latter
prisoners were usually transferred directly from solitary confinement,
so ravaged by their illness that they were scarcely aware of the punish-
ments the prison had imposed. Furthermore, I have no way of guess-
ing how many other mentally ill prisoners remained in prison in a state
of quiet terror, subject to repeated abuse by other prisoners, convinced
they would be killed if they ever tried to resist.
It is perhaps more difficult to imagine the disasters that result from
sending a sane man to a hospital. I shall attempt to describe some of
the disasters I witnessed at John Howard. The patients committed to
John Howard Pavilion as not guilty by reason of insanity sorted out
into three categories. The first group were psychotic and were not
much different from patients in any mental hospital. They did not
need to be in a maximum security facility, and I do not believe they
needed a criminal court to review their treatment. The second group
of patients seemed no different from convicts in prison; indeed, many
had long criminal records. Many were "ideological outlaws": profes-
sional drug dealers, car thieves, and armed robbers. A few were even
involved in organized crime. Many simply lacked the common sense
to stay out of trouble though they were not "ideological outlaws." This
group of patients had none of the psychiatric diagnoses we usually as-
sociate with "insanity." For the most part, they were drug addicts or
12. Lorton Reformatory is the prison facility for convicted felons in the District
of Columbia.
Vol. 1973:871
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problem drinkers, or simply had deviant personalities. They had been
found not guilty by reason of insanity as a result of successful malinger-
ing or as a result of a quirk in judgment of the psychiatrist who ex-
amined them. I honestly do not believe any jury given full information
concerning such defendants would find them insane. Finally, the third
group of patients were habitual criminals who had coincidentally be-
come psychotic. Their criminal records antedated the onset of their
psychoses, and certainly the psychoses were not responsible for their
criminal careers. These patients had been found not guilty by reason
of insanity because under Durham it was almost impossible to say that
the crime was not the product of the illness if that illness was of psychotic
proportions at the time of the crime. However, in the course of treating
such patients it often became apparent that there was a reciprocal rela-
tionship between their psychoses and their criminality: recovery from the
psychosis might restore full viciousness and cunning to a patient who had
been perplexed and docile while psychotic. I particularly remember the
case of one young robber who became hallucinated and catatonic while in
jail awaiting trial. His cell-mates took advantage of his helplessness by
gang-raping him, and when he was transferred to John Howard Pa-
vilion, he was terrified and grieving about having lost his "manhood."
After a few weeks of medical treatment his hallucinations, catatonia
and helplessness were gone, and a few weeks after that it was dis-
covered that he had taken to initiating new admissions to the ward who
were helplessly psychotic by brutalizing and forcibly raping them. It
struck me as ironic that recovery from psychosis often made such pa-
tients into more effective criminals, who would be released when there
was finally no illness remaining to inhibit their dangerousness.
If all of this sounds like a perversion of the theory of "productivity"
intended in Durham, I can only agree, while still pointing out that this
was an effect that the Durham rule had in actual practice. And in all
fairness I suspect such defendants would be handled much the same
way under ALI, for the special problem posed by these defendants
cannot be dealt with in the narrow context of the relationship between
the illness and the single crime currently being prosecuted. The prob-
lem only becomes apparent when you examine the relationship between
the illness and the defendant's whole criminal career.
From this point on I will artificially simplify the patient population
into two groups. For the sake of brevity those patients who resemble
ordinary psychiatric patients without criminal involvement will be
termed "psychotic" and those patients resembling ordinary convicts inhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss1/7
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prison will be referred to as "habitual criminals." (Hospital attendants
referred to the same two groups as "sick" and "slick" respectively.)
Now let us return to the disasters that result if a sane man is sent to
the hospital. From the above description you may see that in John
Howard Pavilion there was no separation of "habitual criminals" from
"psychotics," a policy which John Howard himself had advocated as an
essential element of humanitarian penal reform. The effect of locking
up these two groups together seems much the same in a hospital as in
a prison. The "criminals" prey upon the "psychotics": they shake
them down for money; they take away their possessions; they frighten
them for the fun of it; they force sodomy on them; they give them il-
legal drugs to watch the antics that result. More indirectly, they force
the psychotics to live in a prison atmosphere. Before working in John
Howard Pavilion I had been inclined to think that much of the bru-
tality of prison life was imposed upon prisoners by prison staff as part
of their punishment. While working at John Howard Pavilion I was
surprised to see how much brutality is imposed by the inmates them-
selves upon each other.
The average ward at John Howard Pavilion had thirty-five patients,
who were supervised by three unarmed attendants. Clearly, the at-
tendants were in no position to oppress the patients in any way. In-
deed, they had their hands full trying to nip trouble between patients
in the bud: negotiating compromises; manipulating collective opinion
on the ward into prudent directions; and maintaining a shaky peace.
But three attendants cannot keep a constant eye on thirty-five patients,
and the "criminal" faction carried on its activities out of sight. It was
rumored that the drug traffic in the hospital had a liquid capital of
$1000, and this money did not just lie around. Much of it was em-
ployed in gambling, which led to temper outbursts, debts, grudges,
and pressure to pay up. Ward inspections regularly revealed that a
high percentage of patients had weapons: knives, clubs, brass knuckles,
garottes and even occasional firearms. Clearly, the peace of the wards
was being maintained in part by a balance of terror, and one might
imagine that a new admission would feel pretty panicky until he had
obtained a weapon of his own. Indeed, we sometimes discovered wor-
ried relatives trying to smuggle weapons in for patients.
With all this illicit activity the need for secrecy was high, and the
"psychotic" patients saw and heard things from time to time which
they feared they could be killed for repeating. One patient had his
Vol. 1973: 87]
Washington University Open Scholarship
100 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1973:87
eye put out as a warning to keep quiet about what he knew about the
dope traffic on his ward.
Contraband money was also put to good use in the shylocking trade.
The going interest rate was said to be twenty-five percent per week.
Shylocking had a fringe benefit in that it could function as the "camel's
nose" in the process of corrupting an attendant. A one-week loan
might tide an attendant over until his next paycheck, especially if, as a
special favor, there were little or no interest. If the attendant wer6
called upon for a few little favors in return, he might suddenly find
himself in a situation where a group of patients could get together and
have him fired by reporting some of the favors he had done for them.
And the process could lead from there into frank felony. It was a
generally accepted fact that the John Howard Pavilion dope and gam-
bling traffic could not have existed without the assistance of some of the
attendants. Although no attendant was caught while I was there, many
of them talked quite freely of the corruption problem. One of them
objected to a proposed policy of frisking attendants as they came into
and out of the building on this basis: "If they did that, the corrupt
ones would all quit, and if that happened there would be so few of us
left that it wouldn't be safe, and we'd all have to quit." Indeed, the
grapevine would sometimes report that the corruption on a given ward
had reached such a point that the attendant staff as a body was
"owned" by a clique of patients, and for all intents and purposes the
"mafia' was running the ward.
I think it is significant that the term "mafia" was sometimes used by
the ward attendants to describe the hoodlum element of the patient
population, for there was a tendency of the "habitual criminals"
on each ward and throughout the hospital to organize. Organization
depended on the presence of a "boss": a hoodlum who by ambition
and ability would attain a position of leadership over the other "ha-
bitual criminals" on the ward and thus direct and coordinate their ac-
tivities. 3 A boss' authority over his following was based on personal
loyalty, and a certain quality of charisma was an absolute necessity for
a boss. The bosses I knew of were all quite intelligent, charming,
likeable people who not only made friends easily among the patients,
13. In the narcotics trade for instance, a boss' retinue might include a "bagman"
who handled all the money and narcotics, a "corpsman" who administered injections,
some "goons" to lean on people, and some "flunkies" for odd jobs. The boss himself
might not have to handle either money or drugs or personally resort to violence.
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but had also so completely won over at least one member of the pro-
fessional staff that he was blind to the boss' faults. If a ward had no
"criminal" with enough charisma to be a boss, its hoodlum element re-
mained unorganized, and there seemed to be much less illicit activity.
However, some bosses were able to utilize the period in the exercise
yard to organize or at least penetrate more than one ward. Clearly
the hospital would have been much better off without any such bosses,
and clearly they had no business in the hospital. Far from being in-
sane by any test, they were not even mentally ill (except for one who
was a heroin addict). Indeed, they were highly competent people
who were quite successful in their chosen profession of crime.
I have no reason to suspect that the prison atmosphere of endemic
brutality that existed in John Howard Pavilion was any different from
that in other hospitals for the criminally insane, for it did not result
from laxness or incompetence in the hospital staff. It was simply the
inevitable result of locking up a group of ideological outlaws in a fa-
cility in which the inmates far outnumber their attendants. We all
know that such endemic brutality is customary in prisons, though I do
not think we ought to condone it. Undesirable as such features are
in a prison, they are downright intolerable in a hospital. It is as in-
humane to confine hoodlums and psychotics together now as it was in
John Howard's day, and I feel there can be no excuse in any legal
theory for the perpetuation of this practice.
Still another disaster may occur when a sane man is found not guilty
by reason of insanity: he may view himself as being able to escape
from justice, and nothing that happens in the hospital is likely to make
him less dangerous. He is most likely to be released within two years
to resume his career in crime. Statistics tell us that he will probably
commit many crimes before being again subjected to an earnest felony
prosecution. And when that happens he will have a record of being
"criminally insane." The original mistake is likely to be repeated. We
had a few such "revolving door" case histories at John Howard Pa-
vilion. One of them used to gloat that the doctor who had originally
discovered his "schizophrenia" had handed him a "license to do bur-
glaries" which he had made good use of ever since. He referred to St.
Elizabeths Hospital as the "headquarters for my operation." John
Howard Pavilion was often characterized by the hoodlums spending
time there as "a good camp."
Having reviewed the practical effects of poor validity in a sanity
test, let us finally judge the three tests reviewed in Brawner with regard
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to validity. First of all, we should note that the differences in reliabil-
ity in the tests will affect their respective validity. Poor reliability takes
precedence over good validity in determining the practical usefulness
of a test. Therefore the Durham test has probably sent a higher per-
centage of defendants to the wrong place than the AL will, assuming
that the two tests both have good validity.
However, I do not think we can make that assumption. I doubt
that these tests are even much good for determining the state of the de-
fendant's mind at the time of the crime, let alone for predicting the
best disposition of the case. For there is a basic source of error we
have not even considered yet, and that is malingering.
The Problem of Malingering
In all sanity tests presently employed, a crucial step is the examina-
tion of the patient by a psychiatrist. The examination he performs is
not much different from an ordinary psychiatric evaluation. Now in
any medical evaluation the history is by far the most important part.
The physical and laboratory examinations taken together are not nearly
as likely to contain important findings as is the history alone. In psy-
chiatry the history virtually dominates the evaluation; probably less
than five percent of the facts on which psychiatric diagnoses are based
come from sources other than the history. However, in the ordinary
doctor-patient relationship the history is generally obtained from a pa-
tient who in some sense understands that his own interests are best
served by trying to report his experiences to the doctor exactly as he
remembers them. On the other hand, a defendant receiving a pretrial
psychiatric examination in connection with a felony charge generally un-
derstands that as a result of that examination he will either be sent to
prison for a definite and possibly lengthy period of time, or else he will
be sent to a hospital for the criminally insane for an unknown and po-
tentially unlimited period of confinement. He may have a strong pref-
erence for one of these two fates. He may have his own theories about
how he can get the psychiatrist to send him where he wants to go. The
psychiatrist does not necessarily know where the defendant wants to go
and he certainly does not know the defendant's theories about insanity.
He only knows what the defendant actually has told him. Even if he
suspects that a defendant may be malingering, there is not much he
can do about it. If a man says he hears voices, who is to say he does
not? No one else is supposed to hear them. If a man says he believes
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the Communists are taking over the country by replacing people with
lookalike robots, who is to say he does not believe it? Likewise, a
defendant may deny or simply not mention symptoms that really are
present. And the only account the psychiatrist has of what was going
on in the defendant's mind when he committed the crime is the ac-
count the defendant has provided.
Now I am sure that these objections to the accuracy of pretrial ex-
aminations are as old as the insanity defense itself, but let me assure
you that I think this problem is very real. The psychiatric histories ob-
tained in pretrial evaluations are quite different from those obtained
in "civilian" psychiatry, and I would guess that in perhaps a quarter of
the cases I reported to the court, my conclusions were based on signifi-
cant false data. I believe that malingering is done in both directions,
and I suspect that mentally ill defendants reporting a negative psychia-
tric history usually succeed in being found sane. I believe that most
forensic psychiatrists have at some point in their careers confronted
this general theoretical problem and have resolved it by deciding that
the only malingering that exists is that which they detect, and having
thus reassured themselves, they proceed to reassure the courts as well.
But I myself have seen so much successful malingering that I cannot
reassure myself or anyone else on this point.
The Problem of Defining "Mental Disease"
A second major source of impaired validity that affects both Dur-
ham and ALI is the requirement that to be insane a defendant must
have a mental disease. Now you would not think that such a com-
monsense policy as that could make much mischief, but it certainly
does when you try to apply it in practice. The second edition of the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual,'4 which is the standard for Ameri-
can psychiatric nomenclature, tries to be comprehensive and provide a
diagnostic label to fit anyone a psychiatrist might ever see in his office.' 5
14. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
FOR MENTAL DISORDERS (2d ed. 1968).
15. For instance, there are ten different personality disorders, an example of
which is "obsessive-compulsive personality," defined as: "This behavior pattern is
characterized by excessive concern with conformity and adherence to standards of con-
science. Consequently, individuals in this group may be rigid, over-inhibited, over-
conscientious, over-dutiful, and unable to relax easily." AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC Asso-
CIATION, supra note 14, at 43. The diagnosis of "transient situational disturbance" is
defined as follows: "This major category is reserved for more or less transient dis-
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This is very convenient for filling out insurance forms on patients who are
not really sick but just have problems.
But real disputes arise in sanity determinations over the question of
whether a particular diagnosis is or is not a "mental disease." As a
general rule a court will accept a diagnosis as a "mental disease" if the
expert witness says it is. But psychiatrists do not agree at all among
themselves as to which of these diagnoses are diseases. Psychiatrists
are even less in agreement as to the general definition of what consti-
tutes mental disease, although many psychiatric theorists have opinions
on this point. But it sometimes happens in a trial that the psychiatrists
agree on the defendant's symptoms and diagnosis, but they disagree as
to whether the diagnosis in question is a mental illness. Such cases are
not rare, and they would be far more frequent if every defendant were
examined by more than one psychiatrist. Since most defendants are
examined by only one psychiatrist, this issue is usually resolved invisi-
bly by the luck of the draw. Now, to have a sanity verdict be deter-
mined by the examining psychiatrist's views on a rather arcane area of
abstract psychiatric theory, rather than by the facts (poorly as they may
be known) of the defendant's psychiatric history, seems ridiculous to
me. And yet the problem appears to have no solution. The following
two attempts at solutions have failed:
1) The McDonald definition of "mental disease""' is far too broad to
be of any help with this problem. Indeed, its only purpose seems to
have been to broaden the range of testimony about the defendant
deemed to be admissible to the jury. But look what happens if we try
to apply McDonald to the problem of specific diagnoses: Is heroin ad-
diction a "mental disease" under Durham-McDonald? I must confess
I cannot think of a psychiatric illness that better fits the Durham-Mc-
Donald definition of insanity. It is the only psychiatric disease that
has as one of its typical manifestations an irresistible compulsion to
commit crimes. It is the only psychiatric disease in which the impair-
ment of behavior control can be measured: less than five percent of
addicts who have been withdrawn and returned to the community are
orders of any severity (including those of psychotic proportions) that occur in indi-
viduals without any apparent underlying mental disorders and that represent an acute
reaction to overwhelming environmental stress." Id. at 48. The Manual cites re-
sentment associated with an unwanted pregnancy as an example of this latter diag-
nosis.
16. McDonald v. United States defines a mental disease or defect to include "any
abnormal condition of the mind which substantially affects mental or emotional proc-
esses and substantially impairs behavior controls." 312 F.2d at 851.
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able to avoid readdiction within a year. Voluntary withdrawal from
heroin by persons with access to the drug is virtually unknown. Al-
though the disease has little effect on cognitive processes, there is no
psychiatric disease that has a greater effect on emotional processes.
But in spite of all this, the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia has refused to rule that heroin addiction is a mental
disease that could constitute a basis for the insanity defense under
Durham-McDonald.17  Each time the court makes a new ruling on
this point, the opinion becomes more lengthy, obscure, and the reason-
ing of the court appears more tortuous and artificial. In the meantime,
the trial judges are very straightforward when this issue arises in a trial:
"In the District of Columbia heroin addiction is not a 'mental disease' on
which an insanity defense may be based." I shall return to the problem
of heroin addiction and sanity tests shortly, for I think it helps to show
that the problems inherent in the insanity defense are a Gordian knot
that cannot be unravelled, but must be split open by radical reforms in
the law.
Let me merely add at this point that I do not think the law ought to
decide which diagnoses are valid "mental diseases" by any definitional
rule or list of permissible or impermissible diagnoses. If the psychiat-
ric profession has not solved this problem yet, the law should also leave
it open for dispute.
2) The Court of Appeals seems to feel it has solved the problem by
giving the jury overriding authority to decide in the individual case
whether a given diagnosis is a "mental illness" or not. I do not agree
that this is a satisfactory solution because the vast majority of cases
are decided by the examining psychiatrist alone: there is no jury, and
the court never asks the psychiatrist about his reasoning in deciding
that the diagnosis he made was a valid mental disease.
SHOULD THERE BE AN INSANITY DEFENSE?
Nettlesome as the problems of malingering and of defining "mental
illness" are, they constitute only superficial flaws in the practical applica-
tion of sanity tests. However, there is a more basic flaw that invalidates
every conceivable sanity test. It will be remembered that a prognostic
test is only valid if it predicts what it is supposed to predict. That
means that a sanity test could only fulfill its unique function in deciding
the defendant's fate if it were some variant of the following theme: "A
17. See Gaskins v. United States, 410 F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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defendant is to be found not guilty by reason of insanity if the court de-
termines that it would be disastrous to send him to prison and further-
more determines that commitment to a psychiatric hospital would be
a preferable disposition." Now there never has been and never shall
be any sanity test remotely resembling that example, for traditional le-
gal theory requires that a court can only make the decision whether to
send the defendant to a hospital or a prison by determining whether,
in some theoretical sense, the crime he committed was not really a
crime. But it is not the crime that is sent to prison; it is the criminal.
And the theoretical state of his mind at one single point of time in the
past may well be water over the dam by the time the court is faced
with the question of where to send him. I can only conclude that the
whole traditional theory of the insanity defense (and of criminal com-
mitment as well) is fundamentally invalid.
I do not think there is any way to patch up the insanity defense to
make it work well. Instead, another mechanism should be devised to
decide whether the defendant should go to a hospital. Speaking as a
simple-minded legal layman, it seems to me that a decision about
where to send a defendant is properly a part of the presentencing evalu-
ation and ought not to precede the verdict. Suppose a guilty verdict
could be taken to mean only that the court had determined that a pro-
hibited deed had been done and the defendant was the one who did
it. Then the insanity defense could be abolished. Suppose the theo-
ries and procedures of criminal sentencing could be basically revised so
that the main purpose of a sentence would be to prevent future crimes
rather than to take vengeance for those already committed. Then
it could be a simple matter for a court, having found a defendant
guilty and in need of psychiatric care, to "sentence" the defendant to
a psychiatric hospital. I think it would be much easier to design sen-
tencing statutes and procedures that would keep a defendant from go-
ing to the wrong place than to try to solve all the dilemmas inherent in
the insanity defense. Furthermore, sentencing reform might better al-
low us to cope with all of the mistakes that inevitably are made in psy-
chiatric evaluations of legal offenders. Just as parole can be revoked
or restored, provision might be made for a "convict" to be transferred
from a hospital to a prison, or vice versa, if it became clear that he had
been sent to the wrong place. Another unnecessarily restrictive tradi-
tion might also be broken down: prison sentences are usually set for a
specified period of time whereas hospital commitments are usually in-
determinate. I can see potential advantages to a hospital being given
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a predetermined period of time in which to rehabilitate a "convict" to
the point that he would no longer need supervision by a criminal
court. I can also see potential advantages to indeterminate prison sen-
tences.
I might also mention the advantages that might be gained by sup-
plementing sentencing reform with actual prison reform. Unlike sen-
tencing reform, prison reform would cost a lot of money and would re-
quire a real commitment on the part of the community. But if prisons
were as dedicated to the rehabilitation of their inmates as hospitals are,
and if they received as much community support and review as hospitals
do, the stark differences between these two types of institutions would
begin to fade, and the similarity of their social missions would become
more apparent. A "convict" sent by mistake to the wrong institution
would suffer much less harm, and intermediary facilities might then
arise for those "convicts" who need both prison and a hospital.
The following are examples of two types of defendants that demon-
strate the way in which agonizing dilemmas might disappear if the in-
sanity defense were replaced by sentencing reform.
Heroin Addiction: This is clearly a mental illness, but the data now
available indicate that psychiatric treatment is ineffective in treating
this disease. On the other hand, probation and parole have a very
favorable effect on the attainment of stable abstinence.' 8 If the con-
temporary sanity tests were used honestly in actual practice, they would
all find heroin addicts insane and deprive them of the experience which
would help them the most. Under sentencing reform, addicts could
be given probation precisely because that is what works best. If, as
now appears likely, methadone maintenance proves still better than
parole alone, addicts could be resentenced to require that they partici-
pate in such a program.
Sex Offenders: It is often highly debatable whether any given sex
offender is mentally ill. Certainly few sex offenders meet the usual
criteria for being found not guilty by reason of insanity.'" Yet the very
inadequacy of the prisons for rehabilitation of sex offenders (coupled
18. Vaillant, A Twelve-Year Followup of New York Narcotic Addicts: The
Relation of Treatment to Outcome, 122 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 727 (1966).
19. The sexual deviations may determine what kind of offense a deviant commits,
but just because an individual's libidinal orientation is deviant does not mean he is
powerless to control his sexual impulses. It probably makes no more sense to excuse
a homosexual pedophile of molesting a little boy than it does to excuse a rapist of
molesting a grown woman.
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with the hope that hospital commitment might be a better disposition
for them) has led many jurisdictions to pass criminal sexual psychopath
statutes to allow for commitment of those offenders who cannot be
committed as insane. Sentencing reform could accomplish the same
purpose and eliminate the need for special, discriminatory, and some-
what awkward laws to deal with this one type of legal offender.
I would like to conclude by suggesting that the origin of the insanity
defense as well as the increasing complexity and unwieldiness it has
developed over the years may both be results of the same trend of moral
change in our society that could in the end retire the insanity defense
altogether. The insanity defense arose out of an unwillingness to pun-
ish a man whose offense resulted from a medical affliction. The de-
fense has expanded and raised many problems as our society has de-
veloped more and more scruples about punitive sentencing and has
become more oriented toward non-punitive rehabilitation. In the
course of this trend the death penalty, which was once routine, has be-
come cruel and unusual punishment and has finally been largely aban-
doned.
It is my hope that this trend will lead to reforms that will allow
criminal sentencing to be concerned only with protection of the public
and rehabilitation of the offender. As such reforms progress and sen-
tencing begins to offer offenders hope for the future, we will reach a
point at which the idea of a criminal sentence as a punishment for the
past will seem as cruel and unusual as the death penalty seems now.
It will be at that point that the trend which gave rise to the insanity
defense will have rendered it obsolete.
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